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Attitudes, Reactive
Michelle Mason
The term “reactive attitude” entered the philosophical lexicon with P. F. Strawson’s 
seminal essay “Freedom and Resentment” (2003: 72–93; see strawson, p. f.). 
 Strawson introduces the term to refer to a class of attitudes that respond to qualities 
of will – good, ill, or indifferent – that people manifest toward each other and 
themselves. Consider: You are riding on a crowded bus and someone steps on your 
toe, causing you great pain. In such circumstances, you might understandably feel 
angry. Compare, however, the scenario where the person’s toe-stepping reflects no 
ill will (perhaps the bus took an unexpected turn, forcing the person onto your 
foot) with the scenario where the person intended to cause you pain (perhaps in 
the hope of beating you to the last available seat). In the former case, presumably, 
 resenting the person’s action is out of place in a way that in the second case it 
 arguably is not. The phenomenon of resentment, a paradigmatic reactive attitude 
for  Strawson, thus demonstrates that whether or not a person’s actions and atti-
tudes manifest ill will, indifference, or good will matters to us. It matters, moreover, 
in varying degrees depending on the relationship in which we stand to the person. 
(Try substituting, for example, your spouse for the stranger.) This suggests a con-
nection between the kind of relationship in which we stand to another person and 
the expectations and demands for good will that we legitimately make of them. We 
can thus understand the reactive attitudes to be “reactive” in the sense of being 
reactions to features of persons that manifest their response to the expectations and 
demands of good will that constitute our relationships to one another. To regard 
oneself and others as legitimate targets of reactive attitudes – such as gratitude, 
resentment, forgiveness, love, and moral praise and blame (see gratitude; love; 
blame) – just is to hold oneself and others responsible for meeting such expecta-
tions and demands.
Strawson’s employment of the concept of a reactive attitude is in the service of rec-
onciling traditional opponents in the debate over free will (see free will) and deter-
minism, that is, the incompatibilist and the compatibilist about determinism and 
moral responsibility (see responsibility). Strawson agrees with the  compatibilist in 
arguing that the justification of the reactive attitudes, including those of moral praise 
and blame, does not require free will in any sense of freedom that is incompatible 
with the truth of determinism. At the same time, Strawson is sympathetic to the 
incompatibilist insistence that something vital is lacking in those compatibilist justi-
fications of moral praise and blame that appeal to the efficacy of such attitudes in 
regulating behavior. Thus, although Strawson would have the incompatibilist aban-
don metaphysical worries about free will, he acknowledges a remaining moral worry. 
The moral worry is that the appeal to the efficacy of moral praise and blame provides 
2the wrong sort of justification of moral attitudes that purport to be forms of moral 
address, as opposed to merely tools of social control. Strawson’s reconciling project 
thus requires the incompatibilist to abandon ( metaphysical) freedom of will as a 
 necessary condition of the justification of moral praise and blame, while  requiring the 
compatibilist to concede that appeals to social efficacy are not  adequate  justification.
Strawson’s Catalogue of Reactive Attitudes
Strawson draws a number of distinctions in outlining the concept of a reactive 
 attitude. He first isolates the “personal” or “participant” reactive attitudes, citing 
resentment, gratitude, forgiveness, love, and hurt feelings as paradigm cases. The 
personal reactive attitudes are what Strawson calls “nondetached” in the sense that 
they are “reactions of people directly involved in transactions with each other” (2003: 
75). Although the language of transaction perhaps is unfortunate in suggesting a 
material exchange, Strawson intends to draw our attention to attitudes that typically 
arise in the context of particular interpersonal relationships (e.g., among family 
members, friends, lovers, and colleagues) and direct encounters. The  nondetached, 
personal reactive attitudes are the reactions of persons involved in such relationships 
to each other’s qualities of will as manifested toward each other, in the light of the 
expectations and demands legitimate to relationships of the  relevant kind.
The personal reactive attitudes contrast both with “detached” reactive attitudes 
and with self-reactive attitudes. Strawson describes the detached reactive attitudes, 
of which moral indignation is a paradigm case, as “sympathetic or vicarious or 
impersonal or disinterested or generalized analogues” of the nondetached reactive 
attitudes (2003: 83). Thus, moral indignation is the analogue of  resentment in being 
directed at another person in virtue of the ill will that they manifest but  differs from 
resentment in responding to ill will as manifested toward another, not toward 
 yourself. For example, a stranger’s intentional insult warrants my moral indignation 
when directed at a third person, whereas the insult warrants my  resentment when 
directed at me. The detached, impersonal reactive attitudes thus are reactions among 
persons whose only relationship may be that in which any two moral agents stand to 
one another, and the expectation of good will they presuppose is one made on behalf 
of moral agents simply considered as such.
Finally, the self-reactive attitudes are a person’s reactions to his or her own quality 
of will as manifested toward others. Your self-reactive attitudes reflect your 
 acknowledgment of (if not always compliance with) the expectations and demands 
that others make on you. Strawson places in this class the sense of obligation, 
 compunction, guilt, remorse, and shame (see guilt; shame and honor).
The Reactive Attitudes as Moral Attitudes
Given Strawson’s understanding of the reactive attitudes as reactions to manifest 
qualities of will and the role he assigns them in constituting moral responsibility, one 
might suppose they are essentially moral attitudes – in a way that attitudes such as 
3disgust or admiration, for example, arguably are not. Strawson’s own account, 
 however, suggests a different understanding of the moral–nonmoral distinction as 
applied to the reactive attitudes. Strawson proposes to distinguish moral from 
 nonmoral reactive attitudes by appealing to his distinction between, respectively, 
detached and nondetached reactive attitudes.
The tendency to view the moral domain as requiring impartiality – such that moral 
demands are addressed, and compliance with them owed, to all – offers one explana-
tion why Strawson may be drawn to designating only the detached reactive attitudes 
“moral.” Even waiving objections that challenge understanding the moral domain in 
this way, however, Strawson’s proposal is problematic. Certainly, the fact that another’s 
insult reflects ill will toward me rather than toward some third person fails to make the 
insult any less morally objectionable as a violation of a legitimate demand for good 
will. In both cases, we can assume, the target of the insult is wronged. Why suppose, 
then, that my subsequent resentment is not properly deemed a moral attitude, with 
indignation, as against a nonmoral attitude such as disgust? Indeed, Strawson (1980) 
later acknowledged his proposal was too  restrictive in limiting the class of moral reac-
tive attitudes to those experienced vicariously or impersonally. Rather than take a 
restrictive understanding of the “moral” to delimit a proper subset of the reactive atti-
tudes, then, one alternatively might welcome the breadth of attitudes Strawson’s con-
cept encompasses as an invitation to reconsider the range of attitudes of significance to 
moral philosophy. On the latter proposal, regarding someone as within the scope of 
the reactive attitudes is constitutive of regarding that person as a moral agent in the 
sense of being answerable to an  expectation or demand that forms part of a system of 
expectations, demands, and rights regulation accordance with which is necessary for 
aspiring to moral  community with one’s fellows. Absent some further distinction 
among particular reactive attitudes, then, there is no reason to suppose that certain of 
them (e.g., indignation) are privileged so far as their moral import is concerned.
The Objective Attitude
The fundamental moral import of the reactive attitudes in general is evident once one 
turns to Strawson’s distinction between reactive attitude and “objective” attitude. 
When we take what Strawson calls the objective attitude toward a person, we view 
him or her as “an object of social policy; as a subject for what, in a wide range of sense, 
might be called treatment” (2003: 79). Consider, again, the example of a stranger on 
the bus who steps on your toe, causing you great pain. Suppose that you find yourself 
resenting the stranger because you believe she deliberately stepped on your toe out of 
frustration at not getting your seat. Later, however, you discover that the person has 
Tourette Syndrome and that her behavior is a symptom of her disease. This explana-
tion of the stranger’s toe-stepping behavior breaks the  connection between the behav-
ior and the person’s attitude toward you. You thus come to realize that the behavior 
does not manifest ill will or indifference to your pain in the way that justified resent-
ment presupposes. In short, her condition gives the stranger an excuse and gives you 
a reason to forgo resenting her symptomatic behavior. Imagine, however, that you 
4were to regard all of someone’s behavior as if it were like the involuntary physical and 
verbal tics characteristic of Tourette  Syndrome and, so, divorced from his attitudes 
toward you and his judgments about how to behave toward you. Imagine, that is, 
that  you were to regard his behavior never as expressions of his will but as mere 
 happenings – much as you regard the weather. You would thereby take toward him 
the attitude that is Strawson’s concern in  speaking of the wholly objective attitude.
To take the wholly objective attitude toward someone is to cease to regard him as 
a moral agent. It is a stance adopted at significant cost to the possibilities for 
 relationship, for as Strawson poignantly expresses it, “If your attitude towards 
 someone is wholly objective, then though you may fight him, you cannot quarrel 
with him, and though you may talk to him, even negotiate with him, you cannot 
reason with him. You can at most pretend to quarrel or to reason with him” 
(2003: 79). In a relatively neglected passage, Strawson also insightfully acknowledges 
the phenomenon of adopting the objective attitude as a strategic refuge from “the 
strains of involvement” in a relationship – albeit a strategy that forebodes the 
 relationship’s likely demise (2003: 79–80).
Relevance to the Debate Over Free Will and Determinism
How does Strawson intend his investigation of the reactive attitudes, understood as 
above, to reconcile the incompatibilist and the compatibilist about determinism and 
moral responsibility? Strawson sides with the view of someone he dubs “the  optimist” – 
a compatibilist – in arguing that being a legitimate target of the reactive attitudes does 
not require that one’s will be free in any metaphysically robust sense that would be 
undermined by the truth of determinism. Moral responsibility requires not freedom 
in that sense but, rather, freedom from a range of standard excusing conditions. 
Strawson nonetheless is sympathetic to a moral worry that might nag a person he 
dubs “the pessimist” – an incompatibilist libertarian – and which the pessimist might 
press against those compatibilists (such as Strawson’s own example of P. Nowell-Smith 
[1948]), who wed an account of (nonmetaphysical) conditions of moral responsibility 
to a utilitarian justification of our evaluative practices. The worry with the latter is 
that, first, it treats the targets of our moral praise and blame as objects for social con-
trol rather than as moral agents. Second, it provides the wrong kind of reason to jus-
tify our evaluative practices: in appealing to the fact that the target will be positively or 
negatively influenced rather than the fact that the target otherwise merits or deserves 
praise or blame, it fails to capture the intrinsic value to us of standing in the relation-
ships of mutual regard that the reactive  attitudes constitute (see desert).
With the compatibilist, Strawson emphasizes the significance of the kinds of 
 conditions that we in practice tend to treat as conditions calling for the modification 
or withdrawal of reactive attitudes that would otherwise be warranted. Among the 
excusing conditions Strawson highlights are, in one category, considerations that alter 
our view of the relevant behavior of an agent (e.g., some injury or benefit)  without 
altering our view of the agent: the agent remains a person properly placed within the 
scope of the reactive attitudes. In the example of the stranger who steps on your toe, 
5the stranger has caused you an injury. But where the circumstances of the injury are 
such that the stranger’s behavior manifests no disregard of  expectations, demands, and 
rights regulation accordance with which is necessary for aspiring to moral community 
with us, the circumstances enjoin us to view the injury as an  inappropriate basis for 
resentment. They do not, Strawson emphasizes, “invite us to view the agent as other 
than a fully responsible agent. They invite us to see the injury as one for which he was 
not fully, or at all, responsible” (2003: 77–8). In addition to force, Strawson includes in 
this first class of excusing conditions ( nonculpable) ignorance, among others.
A second class of excusing conditions differs from the first in altering our view not of 
the behavior but of the agent – either temporarily (subclass 2a) or indefinitely so (sub-
class 2b). In 2a Strawson groups cases where a person has acted out of character, under 
great stress, or even post-hypnotic suggestion. Class 2b includes the cases of children, 
psychological compulsion, and pathology. Class 2 cases call in varying degrees for the 
suspension of our typical expectations or demands for good will from the person in 
question. In thus calling for us to view the person as lying outside the proper scope of 
the reactive attitudes, they call for adopting the objective attitude toward the person.
Strawson’s investigation of the conditions that we typically treat as calling for the 
modification or withdrawal of reactive attitudes gives rise to two lines of response to 
the incompatibilist. First, with regard to the participant reactive attitudes, he argues 
that it would be “practically inconceivable” to abandon them altogether, because to 
abandon them would entail a form of emotional isolation that would make adult 
relationships as we know them impossible. Second, supposing it were possible for us 
to so alter our psychology, he argues that the truth of determinism would not suffice 
to render such a choice rational; the weight of countervailing reasons for retaining 
our practices as they stand is simply too great to be outweighed by whatever reason 
a conviction in such a theoretical truth is thought to provide. Finally, Strawson 
argues that, as it goes with the personal reactive attitudes, so too with their  impersonal 
analogues: “they stand or lapse together” (2003: 87). That is, although Strawson 
acknowledges that it might be easier to conceive of forgoing impersonal attitudes, 
such as indignation, without as great a cost to our relationships as the abandonment 
of the personal reactive attitudes would entail, the result would be a form of “abnor-
mal egocentricity” (2003: 87). It would be so, presumably, because it would require 
one to treat responses to the expectations and demands that one makes on those 
with whom one stands in special relationships as significant to oneself but of no 
significance to other members of the moral community.
While Strawson thus lends support to the compatibilist cause, he nonetheless 
offers a novel account of the status of the excusing conditions, an account meant to 
comfort the incompatibilist. Whereas compatibilists such as Nowell-Smith and 
J. J. C. Smart (1961) take conditions that call for forgoing praise and blame to do so 
because neither will influence the target’s future behavior, Strawson suggests another 
explanation: in the cases where an excusing condition is present, the behavior is not 
properly regarded as an expression of the agent’s will. The significance of the 
 excusing conditions for Strawson, then, lies not in their implications for the 
 possibility of controlling a person’s future behavior but in their implications for what 
6the person’s actions express or mean in the context of their relationships. Far from 
tools of social control, moral praise and blame emerge on Strawson’s picture as 
 invaluable forms of moral address. That this is so even in the case of moral 
 indignation is registered in the fact that moral offenders accept that they merit such 
reactive attitudes for violating legitimate expectations of good will, an acceptance 
reflected in their corresponding forfeiture of the reactive attitudes that injury would 
typically provoke (e.g., resentment). This, then, is the vital element that the 
 incompatibilist correctly demands of the utilitarian compatibilist and which 
Strawson’s account of the reactive attitudes aims to provide.
Relevance of the Reactive Attitudes in Contemporary 
Moral Psychology
Although Strawson’s work on the reactive attitudes is perhaps most often cited in the 
context of philosophical discussions of moral responsibility, it enjoys a broader 
influence on contemporary moral philosophy. A less remarked but nonetheless 
 significant achievement of the work, especially given the time and context of its 
writing, is the attention it focused on a broad range of sentiments that contemporary 
Anglo-American moral philosophers had long neglected (see sentiments, moral). 
Most recently, the work has inspired important contributions to the metaethics of 
moral obligation. Stephen Darwall draws on what he dubs “Strawson’s Point” – the 
view that “Desirability is a reason of the wrong kind to warrant the  attitudes and 
actions in which holding someone responsible consists in their own terms” (Darwall 
2006: 15) – to support a sophisticated account of a perspective he calls “the second-
person standpoint.” The second-person standpoint implicit in the reactive attitudes, 
Darwall argues, is indispensable for understanding the authority that moral obliga-
tions purport to have over us all.
See also: blame; desert; free will; gratitude; guilt; love; responsibility; 
sentiments, moral; shame and honor; strawson, p. f.
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